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The economic evaluation of health care deals with priority-setting among various health
actions and with the scope of public {as opposed to private{ provision of medical insurance
or health care. All these issues involve trade-os, between dierent possible allocations of
medical resources and between medical and non medical uses of resources. Whether one
faces them explicitly or lets them be made as the unintentional outcome of the actions of
various agents, choices are necessarily made in these matters. The criteria of economic
evaluation are designed to bring rationality to this decision-making process.
Traditional welfare economics usually takes it as axiomatic that individual preferences
should be the ultimate guide in all matters of resource trade-os. Yet evaluation criteria
that incorporate individual preferences, and more specically individual willingness-to-
pay, have been submitted to recurrent criticism by health economists. This criticism can
be summarized under four main headings: (a) introducing willingness-to-pay implies that
a larger weight is given to the preferences of the rich as compared to the poor; (b) using
a money metric to decide about matters of health is ethically repugnant. `Many decision
makers might object to monetary values being placed on something as fundamental as
health' (Oliver et al. 2002, p. 1774); (c) whenever one relies on individual preferences,
one has to adopt a welfarist approach which seeks to measure and compare levels of
subjective happiness or satisfaction across people, and such welfarism is not acceptable
from an ethical point of view; (d) empirically, health-income trade-os are too dicult to
measure for the method to be practically useful. A large literature on economic evaluation
of health care displays a wide variety of views on these issues, which include variants of
welfarism and Paretianism, \extra-welfarist" approaches focusing on health with some
limited role for individual preferences in the valuation of health states, and \decision-
maker" approaches which would let politicians do the hard ethical job.1
1See e.g. Culyer (1989), Wagsta (1991), Broome (1993), Culyer and Wagsta (1993), Pauly (1995),
Culyer and Evans (1996), Kenkel (1997), Weinstein and Manning (1997), Hurley (1998), Nord (1999),
2We start from the idea that it is indeed desirable to rely on the population's pref-
erences, at least to some extent, in order to set priorities in health care. Truly enough,
individual preferences are not always reliable and may be plagued with many aws of
irrationality, myopia, interdependence, anti-social drives, and so on. It is even possible
that some of these shortcomings are especially frequent in matters of health and health
care. We agree that in these cases revealed or stated preferences should be corrected
before using them for economic evaluation. But, beyond these aws, human well-being is
the ultimate scale of value, and human well-being is deeply connected to people's goals
in their lives, i.e., to their preferences. Let us imagine a population with preferences
which are extremely concerned with health and much less with other goods. Would it not
be normal for such a population to spend more on health than another population with
less extreme preferences? Now imagine a population which is supremely concerned with
mental health. Would it not be normal for such a population to spend more on mental
health, as compared to other branches of health care, than other populations? Who is in
the position to legitimately overrule people's own ideas about what is important in life,
for decisions with a direct impact on these people themselves?
Acceptance of a preference-based approach implies that we have to rebut the four
points of criticism. First, we fully agree that in order to construct sensible criteria for
economic evaluation, one needs a sound set of ethical principles dealing with distributive
justice. Resource allocation problems involve conicts of interests between individuals
who may compete for the scarce resources, or simply disagree on the best use of public
resources from which they will collectively benet. Therefore, taking a position on dis-
tributive justice is unavoidable. In particular, we will argue in Section 2 that neglecting
the distributional problem is but one, and actually a rather unpalatable, position.
Second, we believe that the widespread repugnance against the money metric is based
Brouwer and Koopmanschap (2000), Sassi et al. (2001), Mooney and Russell (2003) and, for a synthesis
defending welfare economics, Birch and Donaldson (2003).
3on a misunderstanding. In fact cost-benet analysis can be expressed in any numeraire.
Health (QALYs, for instance) could serve as a numeraire almost as well as money. The
only thing that really drives cost-benet analysis is the possibility to convert changes in
all dimensions of well-being into changes in a single dimension (that of the numeraire).
However, as we will explain in Section 2, this argument hinges crucially on the use of
distributional weights.
Third, and this is the main point of our paper, it simply is not true that relying on
individual preferences implies welfarism. The welfarist approach is just one possibility, and
in Section 3 we will actually defend another approach, based on the concept of \equivalent
income", as an ethically more attractive way of introducing distributional considerations
while respecting preferences.
Fourth, we show in Section 4 how our proposed methodology for dealing with dis-
tributive justice in health care evaluation, involving the concept of equivalent income,
can be implemented in practice, and we present the empirical results from a pilot study.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Cost-benet analysis and distributional weights
We take a simple model in which the situation of individual i (i = 1;:::;n) is depicted by
(yi;hi;zi); where yi denote i's income, hi his health and zi other dimensions of well-being
such as leisure, public goods, social relations...2 The quantities hi and zi can be multi-
dimensional vectors, and each component hik takes values between 0 (the worst state)
and 1 (good health in this dimension). Let h = (1;:::;1) denote the state of good health.
This state of good health is the same for all individuals
The exercise of economic evaluation boils down to a social ordering of the vectors
2The vector zi can also depict variables such as market prices. Then yi is simply nominal income.
Another possible reading of the model is that yi is a suitable notion of real income, in which case market
prices are already taken into account in yi:
4((y1;h1;z1);:::;(yn;hn;zn)). This statement is very general, as dierent social orderings
may reect dierent ethical considerations and, more specically, dierent views on equity
and eciency. As proposed by Bergson (1938) and Samuelson (1947), it is then convenient
to dene the criterion for economic evaluation in terms of a real-valued social welfare
function
E((y1;h1;z1);:::;(yn;hn;zn));
which simply is a numerical representation of the social ordering.
Let us now assume that individual i has her own preference ordering over (yi;hi;zi)








means that i considers (yi;hi;zi) to be at least as good as (y0
i;h0
i;z0
i): The terms Ii and
Pi will denote the associated indierence and strict preference relations. We moreover
assume that this preference ordering is monotonic in yi and hi; so that yi  y0
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We can now use this preference information to give a more specic form to the general
evaluation function E(:). If this function satises the Pareto principle according to which
two situations yield the same social welfare if every individual is indierent between them,
and one situation yields a greater welfare if at least one individual prefers it while nobody
prefers the other, then for every collection of utility functions ui representing Ri for each
5i = 1;:::n, there exists an increasing function W such that
E((y1;h1;z1);:::;(yn;hn;zn)) = W(u1(y1;h1;z1);:::;un(yn;hn;zn)): (1)
We consider that the Pareto principle is a good principle if one wants to respect individual
preferences and we assume throughout this paper that the social welfare function should
be decomposable as in (1). However, the phrase \for every collection of utility functions
ui representing Ri" is essential. It is not assumed at this stage that utility is cardinally
measurable nor that it is interpersonally comparable. Therefore, the use of the social
welfare function W does not imply that one is welfarist.
The role of individual preferences in (1) should be carefully dened. More specically,
the social welfare function E (or W) should incorporate the eciency and equity concerns
of the evaluator, not necessarily those of any particular member of the population under
scrutiny. It is sometimes claimed that `for distributional issues to matter individuals have
to be concerned with the distribution' (Johannesson 1999, p. 382), as if the evaluator was
constrained by the ethical opinions of the population. But even in a society of perfect
egoists, there are equity issues and the social criterion should embody equity principles.
The problem of economic evaluation is to adjudicate individual interests according to
one particular political view or a sample of political views (with a dierent social welfare
function for each view), not to synthesize the citizens' political views into a \collective"
doctrine. Note that we only introduced self-centered preferences Ri in (1). In so doing,
we do not assume that people are selsh. Simply, even if individuals may have ethical
opinions about the distribution, be altruistic or resentful towards their fellow citizens
or have meddlesome preferences about their neighbors' lifestyle, the social criterion only
asks them what they prefer for themselves.3 Dierent ethical opinions will be captured
3If individual preferences over one's situation depend on the others' situations, then Ri is not well
dened because it changes from one allocation to the other. We assume away such diculties, and
consider that the best way to tackle them in practice may be to ask people what they would want for
themselves if the others were always in a similar situation as theirs.
6by dierent specications of E(:) or W(:).
In order to keep the analysis simple, we will focus on the problem of evaluating an
innitesimal change to some initial situation. That is, we consider a situation in which
each individual vector (yi;hi;zi) is changed into (yi+dyi;hi+dhi;zi+dzi): Social welfare,
as a result, changes by the amount dE; and the change is good or bad depending on






















@yi denotes the vector of social marginal rates of substitution between










@yi is the social marginal value of i's income.
Under the Pareto principle, one can equivalently write (assuming dierentiability of






















In particular, the social marginal rates of substitution are then equal to the individual
marginal rates of substitution, which can be denoted MRSh
i and MRSz
i (recall that these
are vectors with as many dimensions as components in h and z; respectively). In other
words, the social criterion espouses individual views on the trade-o between personal
income and other personal goods such as health. Note again that these marginal rates
of substitution only depend on preferences, and that no assumptions of cardinality or




i :dhi + MRSz
i :dzi

can be read as a willingness to pay
4This problem can also encompass the problem of comparing two alternative reforms to the initial
situation, since one reform is better than the other if, taking the latter as a starting point, moving to the
former is a good thing.
7for the change [dyi;dhi;dzi], since if one subtracted this amount from dyi; one would then



















We therefore let WTPi denote

dyi + MRSh
i dhi + MRSz
i dzi











So far, we have been walking in Bergson and Samuelson's footsteps. An important
feature of (2) is that it distinguishes an empirical quantity, WTPi; and an ethical param-
eter, i; which encapsulates distributional judgments. These distributional parameters
i have embarrassed many an economist. Therefore some cost-benet analyses have pro-
ceeded simply by ignoring them and computing the unweighted sum
P
i WTPi:5 The
above analysis immediately shows that this attitude is no more distributionally neutral
than any other choice of parameters. In spite of the visual illusion that the term i seem-
ingly disappears from the formula, this amounts to considering that every individual's
income has the same social priority, no matter how well o or badly o she is. This
reects a specic and highly debatable ethical stance.
Positive arguments in favor of adopting equal weights i can be found. First, there
is the tradition of compensation tests initiated by Kaldor and Hicks. Checking that the
unweighted sum of WTPi is positive is equivalent to checking that the individuals who
5In addition, practitioners of cost-benet analysis very often dene willingness-to-pay only with respect
to the non-income part of the change:
WTPi = MRSh
i dhi + MRSz
i dzi;
and consider the change to be good if the sum of WTPi is greater than the total cost of the change|which
equals the reduction in total income incurred by the population. This is equivalent to checking that the
unweighted sum of WTPi; as dened in our paper, is positive.
8benet from the change could compensate the losers. This approach has, however, been
completely disqualied by welfare economists.6 In particular, the fact that compensation
could be made is not a sucient justication when it is not really made. For example,
such a criterion would justify that the rich rob the poor provided they have a greater
willingness-to-pay for the stolen objects.
Another somewhat more sophisticated argument for ignoring the 's has been oating
around in the literature. Pauly (1995) has been one of the main proponents of this
position stating that `if we observe... that society... does not seem disposed to make
further transfers from rich to poor, then we are not justied in asserting that the same
society would value health benets of a given money value more if they go to poor people
than to rich people' (p. 118). This position does not seem to presuppose a specic
form for E. However, it can be easily seen that it is only valid if we live in a rst-
best world. In such a rst-best context, the government can redistribute income at will
across people, so that if total income is Y; then any distribution (y1;:::;yn) such that
P
i yi = Y is feasible. If the best distribution of the total amount Y is chosen, it maximizes
E((y1;h1;z1);:::;(yn;hn;zn)) under the constraint
P
i yi = Y: For an interior solution, the







i.e., i = j: In a rst-best context, it is therefore correct to assume equal weights in (2)
when the current distribution of income is optimal.
In the more realistic second-best context, however, things are dierent. Assume
that incentive constraints make it impossible to redistribute income without losing some
resources in the process. In our simple setting, this can be represented by a generalized
feasibility constraint
P
i yi = F(y1;:::;yn); where F is an increasing convex function.
6See in particular Arrow (1951), Boadway and Bruce (1984), Blackorby and Donaldson (1990).
9Convexity of the function is meant to capture the fact that reducing income inequality
reduces total income. We can still examine what happens if the distribution is optimal
under this constraint. The rst-order condition of this problem, with  denoting the










implying that the parameter i should be proportional to 1  @F
@yi: Convexity of the function
F suggests that i is decreasing with i's income, although it may also depend on i's health
hi and on zi. In conclusion, in the second-best context, even if we assume that the current
distribution of income is optimal from the point of view of the social welfare function E; the
distributional weights i are not equal, and should exhibit some priority for the worst-o.
The incentive constraints prevailing in the second-best context prevent a fully satisfactory
redistribution of income, so that those at the lower tail of the distribution are left with a
greater degree of priority even if optimal use is made of the available redistributive tools.
If applied to the real world, Pauly's position is simply wrong.7
Before addressing further the issue of distribution, let us rst show how the criterion
(2) relates to the criticism that in cost-benet analysis everything revolves around money.
In fact, the above analysis shows that it is possible to use other numeraires than income.
Health itself, if it were one-dimensional,8 could serve as an alternative metric. Under
this alternative formulation, WTPi would be redened in terms of health, i.e., it would
measure the amount of health reduction that i would accept jointly with the change
(dyi;dhi;dzi) in order to be maintained at his initial satisfaction. There is nothing special
about money in cost-benet analysis. The real ethical requirement is the possibility to
7In contrast, Dr eze and Stern (1987) correctly note that `the optimal non-linear income tax... does
not imply the equality of the social marginal utilities of income... across households: the disincentive
aspects of the non-lump sum tax provide a reason for not fully equating them' (p. 958).
8One-dimensional health is sucient but not necessary. It would suce if health were separable in
everyone's preferences, so that one could dene a sub-utility function of health, such as a \health-utility
index" (Torrance et al. 1995).
10express all changes in many dimensions, for each individual, into his willingness to pay in
some particular dimension. This implies that people do accept trade-os between health
and other consumptions (as we observe in people's everyday choices regarding work, food,
physical exercise, sex, and other dimensions of lifestyle). Money is a convenient numeraire
simply because many statistics are already produced in this unit of measurement.
However, the presence of the distributional parameters i in (2) plays a crucial role
in this interpretation. As was made clear in the exchange of ideas between Brekke (1997),
Dr eze (1998) and Johansson (1998), the choice of numeraire may matter if one uses an
unweighted sum of net benets as the criterion for project evaluation. Suppose one has to
choose between nancing two equally costly treatments which have a similar eect on the
health status (calculated in terms of the number of QALY's) of the individuals concerned.
Illness A hits mainly the (few) rich in a country, while illness B hits mainly the (many)
poor. If QALY's are taken as the numeraire, the unweighted benets criterion will favour
the treatment of illness B. If income is taken as the numeraire, it may well be possible
that priority is given to the treatment of illness A, because the willingness-to-pay of the
rich will be larger than the willingness-to-pay of the poor. The problem in this case,
however, does not reside in the choice of the numeraire, but in the use of an unweighted
benets criterion. When applying (2), social valuations are captured by the distributional
parameters i|and an adequate application of (2) makes the nal evaluation independent
of the choice of numeraire.
We have now established that unweighted cost-benet analysis is based on unpalat-
able distributional judgments. Moreover, the choice for money as the numeraire is only
acceptable in an approach with distributional weights. Therefore, the derivation of these
distributional weights i is essential for economic evaluation. Many authors want to
avoid the danger of putting their personal political preferences into the computation of
the i and have therefore looked for alternatives. We have already described and rejected
one possible approach, which would consist in deriving distributional weights from the
11feelings of altruism within society. Two other related possibilities are salient in the liter-
ature. One is that the economist should simply ask the decision-makers to provide their
own distributional preferences, and incorporate this input into his computations. This
approach typically fails to deliver consistent or precise evaluations. The economist should
not expect the decision-makers to be able to come up with precise gures for the partial
derivatives of E when they presumably hardly understand the concept of a social welfare
function. Another possibility is to retrieve the \revealed distributional preferences" of
society from observed policies . This option is based on the implicit assumption that
society is a homogeneous body with well-dened political preferences. Yet, in a typical
democracy, there is an array of political opinions, each conveying specic distributional
preferences, and there is no reason to believe that the mixture of policies that is observed
corresponds to any stable and well-dened preferences.
It seems to us that the only reasonable way of thinking about the choice of distri-
butional weights is to try to make them correspond to relevant ethical views. As there
are typically several relevant views in a democracy, there is a need for analytical work
in the derivation of weights from basic ethical principles. We believe that it is part of
the job of economists to carry out this analysis. In the next sections we will show how
distributional weights can be derived within a coherent non-welfarist approach respecting
individual preferences.
3 Equivalent income for cost-benet analysis
Our advocacy of cost-benet analysis hinges critically on the use of ethically attractive
distributional weights i. In the rst subsection we summarize the dominant approach
in the literature, which takes it for granted that subjective utility is the correct metric
for distributional judgments. This welfarist approach has recently come under severe
criticism. We will introduce in the second subsection a non-welfarist alternative, ethically
12more attractive and easier to implement.
3.1 The welfarist approach
If one takes subjective utility as the correct metric for distributional judgments, one has
to introduce in (1) a utility function ui; for each i; which does not only represent the
preference ordering Ri (as before), but now also correctly measures subjective utility so








@yi is empirically measurable, the only ethical judgment that remains to be made is









where the parameter " can be interpreted as measuring aversion to inequality. The Ben-
thamite (utilitarian) sum of utilities corresponds to " = 0; and i = @ui=@yi: For other





so that, for a given individual marginal utility of income, i is inversely proportional to
the level of utility (to the power ").
Welfarism has been challenged in many ways. The measurement of subjective utility
is practically very hard to perform and some authors have even questioned the idea that
subjective utility can be meaningfully compared across individuals. In fact, we are not
13aware of any application with explicit values for ui(yi;hi;zi). In the absence of a consensual
measure of utility, it has become common to simply ignore the welfarist decomposition
of i into the two terms and perform a sensitivity analysis with various possible vectors
(1;:::;n) (see, e.g., Donalson, 1999, 2003). This ad hoc approach actually moves us away
from the welfarist setting. Moreover, unless one accepts a simple parametric specication,
such a sensitivity analysis may be a rather daunting task.
More importantly, even if the empirical measurement of utility were not a problem, it
might not be the ethically appropriate metric for interpersonal comparisons. For instance,
Rawls (1982) observes that comparing subjective satisfaction across people with dierent
utility functions is tantamount to assuming that there is an ultimate goal in life which
is \to be satised", and that there is a shared higher-order ordering which enables us to
rank individuals with dierent goals according to how well they succeed with respect to
this higher goal. However, people's goal in life is typically not to be satised with any
goal, but to satisfy their own specic goals. Since there is no consensual higher-order
ordering, Rawls concludes against taking subjective utility as the metric of comparison
and proposes to rely on a resource metric instead. In a similar vein, Dworkin (2000)
argues that people with high ambitions (\expensive tastes") do not deserve to receive
more resources for that sole reason. Sen (1992) also opposes welfarism by raising the
problem of adaptive preferences. Since people adapt their preferences and ambitions to
their current situation, a naive measurement of utility is likely to conclude that inequalities
are not so great because the utility gap between the rich and the poor (or the healthy
and the sick) is not that large.
Many of these arguments have been taken up in the health economics literature, in
which so-called \extra-welfarist" views have gained considerable popularity. These views
should also be seriously considered for cost-benet analysis. We proceed to this task
in the next section. Our particular non-welfarist approach has the merit of respecting
individual preferences in the sense of satisfying the Pareto principle, without falling back
14into full-edged welfarism and, notably, without relying on any other information about
subjective utility than ordinal non-comparable preferences described by the ordering Ri.
Since it is often believed that there is no room between ignoring individual preferences
and full-edged welfarism, it may be useful to correct received wisdom on this topic.
Moreover, we will see that this provides a way to make the computation of distributional
weights easier.
3.2 A non-welfarist alternative
From (2), it is easy to see that the Pareto principle does not require using subjective
utility as the metric of comparison. In this formula, satisfaction of the Pareto principle is
guaranteed by the presence of WTPi; provided that the weights i are all positive. Recall
that WTPi can be computed on the sole knowledge of Ri; since it involves only marginal
rates of substitution. Moreover, one is obviously not forced to compute the weights i on
the basis of subjective utility, so that clearly, it is possible to apply formula (2) without
measuring subjective utility. One might object that the Pareto principle implies that E
can be written as in (1), where utility functions seem to matter. However, recall that (1)
was introduced by saying that for every collection of utility functions ui representing Ri
for each i = 1;:::n, there exists an increasing function W satisfying (1). This allows one
to use utility functions that do not measure subjective utility but nevertheless represent
preferences. We now show that such functions exist and that they can be ethically relevant.
Let us rst consider the hypothetical situation in which all individuals are perfectly
healthy, i.e., hi = h for all i; and all benet from a certain reference value of z; i.e.,
zi = z for all i: In such situations individuals only dier in their income, and they
do not suer from health problems. Theories of justice such as Rawls' and Dworkin's
could, presumably, accept the idea that, when income is the only unequal variable in the
population,9 one can rank the distributions of income without looking at people's utility
9Recall that, since leisure would feature in z; income inequalities in such a situation would not come
15functions and, more specically, that a simple ranking of income distributions could do













The Pareto principle (respect for individual preferences) can now be mobilized to
also rank situations in which individuals have dierent levels of h and z. Assume that for







We propose to call y
i the \equivalent income" of i. It gives i the same satisfaction as





















Equation (5) is in fact a special case of (1) with W being a CES function. In-
deed, the equivalent income y
i, when it is well dened, actually yields one utility func-




from dierent choices of labor.
10Rawls and Dworkin would advocate a strong degree of inequality aversion "; but this is a side issue
here, which, at any rate, does not challenge (4) as such, since " can be arbitrarily high. Moreover, while
the CES-function is a natural candidate and in line with the existing literature, it is clear that other
specications are possible.
11A dierent, axiomatic, derivation of a social criterion involving equivalent incomes can be found in
Fleurbaey (2005).




i); and let y
i;y0
i denote the corresponding equivalent incomes. By










which, by monotonicity of preferences, is equivalent to y
i  y0
i : We will hereafter denote
this particular utility function simply as y
i(yi;hi;zi):
This approach is not welfarist, although it satises the Pareto principle. The welfarist
approach satises the Pareto principle by dening social welfare as a function of individual
subjective utilities ui(yi;hi;zi). The equivalent income y
i(yi;hi;zi) is not a welfarist notion
because it is not a measure of subjective utility. Truly enough, the function y
i(yi;hi;zi) is
a utility function representing Ri; just like ui(yi;hi;zi). But the two functions, although
ordinally equivalent, are dierent. One way of illustrating the dierence is to look at
what happens when two individuals i and j have the same preferences Ri = Rj but
dierent utility functions ui 6= uj: For the welfarist approach, the dierence in utilities
justies a dierent treatment in general. For instance, if ui = uj for some number
 > 1; this may justify giving more resources to j if the function W displays enough
aversion to inequalities, or less resources if W is, for instance, the utilitarian sum. For
the equivalent-income approach, in contrast, this dierence in subjective utility does not
matter, because i and j have the same equivalent income functions y
i = y
j, just as they
have the same preferences Ri = Rj: The equivalent income approach therefore is not
subject to Dworkin's and Sen's criticism with respect to expensive tastes and adaptation.
Of course, the ethical attractiveness of the equivalent income depends on the choice
of reference values for hi and zi: We consider that good health h is a natural choice of a
reference for the following reason. In (4) it is apparent that one considers an individual to
be better o than another whenever he has a greater income, provided both are healthy
only a representation of the preference ordering Ri, and does not refer to a notion of subjective happiness.
17(let us ignore z for the moment). This makes sense, whereas the same kind of judgment
would appear questionable if both individuals were not healthy. Imagine that they have
the same mediocre health and slightly unequal incomes. In this case it is not obvious that
the individual with a greater income is better o. Maybe he cares more about health, and
therefore suers more from his health condition than the other one. This problem cannot
occur with healthy individuals, and it seems reasonable to consider that preferences about
health do not matter in order to evaluate how well-o a healthy individual is. We do not
claim that some healthy individuals do not enjoy their good health more than others. We
simply say that it would be strange to seek to tax the healthy individuals who care about
health in order to subsidize other healthy individuals who care less about health. If one
accepts the idea that equality of incomes would be a sound ideal for a uniformly healthy
population, then the reference to h in (4) should appear acceptable.
As far as the choice of z is concerned, we will be less precise since the content of
the vector zi can vary from one application of this model to the other. As for health,
the choice of z can be guided by the observation that when an individual is at z; his
preferences about zi should no longer matter to evaluate his situation. For instance, if
zi is leisure, one can think that it is only when an individual does not work that his
preferences about labor do not matter. As a consequence, one would then take full leisure
as the reference z: This is just an example and a detailed discussion would go beyond
the scope of this paper.
Using (5) for economic evaluation has the essential advantage that it allows for an








While (6) is formally identical to the welfarist formula (3), it is much easier to implement.
The equivalent income is measured in monetary units and depends only on ordinal and
18non-comparable preferences Ri: In terms of observability, it is therefore comparable to
WTPi: It can also be measured with similar techniques. The only \unobservable" param-
eter in (6) is "; which must be chosen by the analyst or the decision-maker.13 If there is
no consensus about "; it is relatively easy to perform sensitivity analysis with respect to
it. This is much simpler than a general sensitivity analysis over the whole space of vectors
(1;:::;n):
The following proposition summarizes the argument:
Proposition 1 If, for a population with uniformly good health h and uniform z; one
ranks distributions of incomes by a CES function, then respecting individual preferences
implies that the evaluation of any social situation is made by the same CES function
applied to equivalent incomes y
i(yi;hi;zi). In cost-benet analysis the weights are then
equal to i = (y
i(yi;hi;zi))
 " @y
i=@yi and therefore only depend on individual ordinal non-
comparable preferences and on the parameter of inequality aversion in the CES function.
This conclusion shows in particular that, in spite of Arrow's (1951) theorem, and
in agreement with Bergson's (1938, 1966) and Samuelson's (1947, 1977) claims, it is
possible to construct a reasonable social criterion E((y1;h1;z1);:::;(yn;hn;zn)) on the
sole basis of ordinal and non-comparable preferences. The received wisdom that `Arrow
showed that the only possible way to use the social welfare function is to assume that the
individual utility functions are [interpersonally comparable]',14 which is still widespread
among economists, is denitely incorrect.15
13For an analysis of the division of labor between observation and value judgment in various approaches
to the denition of social welfare, see Fleurbaey and Hammond (2004).
14The quote is from Liljas and Lindgren (2001, p. 358), who use the term `cardinal' in order to mean
\interpersonally comparable". Social choice theorists reserve the word \cardinal" for utility functions
which are unique up to an ane transform. Arrow's impossibility is known to hold for cardinal (but
non-comparable) utility functions (Sen 1970).
15For more details on this issue, see e.g. Fleurbaey and Mongin (2005).
194 Estimating equivalent incomes and distributional
weights
In the preceding sections we have argued that distributional weights must be introduced
in any economic evaluation of health care policies. We have suggested that the concept of
equivalent income oers an ethically attractive non-welfarist method for calculating these
weights. In this section, we will show how our theoretical concepts can be implemented
for policy making. We rst argue that it is not necessary to recompute the equivalent
incomes (and hence the distributional weights) for each evaluation exercise. We then
present a set of distributional weights derived from a pilot survey.
4.1 Distributional weights in practice
Implementing the criterion (2) requires estimating (a) the individual willingness-to-pay
WTPi for the change to be evaluated; and (b) the distributional weights i. The former
task is a traditional one, for which various methods have been developed in the litera-
ture. In health care applications, the most prominent approach is to conduct a stated
preferences survey on a representative sample of the concerned population. In such a
contingent valuation survey, one usually presents individuals with a hypothetical scenario
describing the health care intervention and one asks individuals how much they would
be willing to pay to make that intervention available (Donaldson et al., 2006; Donaldson,
2003; Olsen and Smith 2001). Thus, individuals' willingness to pay is specic to the
particular intervention and the estimation exercise needs to be repeated with each new
evaluation exercise. Despite the lasting criticism on this stated preferences method, re-
search in health evaluation and health economics has by now produced supportive results
for its use, provided that the internal validity of the respondent's answers is carefully
checked (Donaldson et al. 2006).
20As is clear from (6), the distributional weights i depend on the equivalent incomes
y
i and not on the particular policy to be evaluated. Equivalent incomes are derived
from individuals' current situation in terms of health (hi) and income (yi) compared to
a situation of perfect health h.16 Therefore, we can evaluate once and for all the equiv-
alent incomes of all individuals in society and apply the corresponding weights to the
willingness-to-pay gures relative to whatever health program or intervention under con-
sideration.17 Of course, gathering information on equivalent incomes or willingness-to-pay
for each individual in society is not feasible. A realistic approach is then to calculate the
equivalent income of a representative sample of the population and to compute average or
median weights for dierent income and health categories, provided that the same cate-
gories are also identied in the willingness-to-pay study. In that respect, the estimation of
distributional weights based on equivalent income follows the same logic as the evaluation
of health utilities (Drummond et al., 1997). Health utilities are evaluated once in a rep-
resentative sample of the general population from which weights are derived that account
for the QALYs gained, which can then be applied to dierent health care interventions.
In the rest of this section we present the results of a pilot study implementing this
methodology.
4.2 Design of the pilot study
The pilot survey was carried out in 2007 with a total number of 542 respondents. Re-
spondents were selected randomly in the dierent areas of the city of Marseilles, France,
and subjected to face-to-face interviews (see Appendix A for sample characteristics). To
calculate equivalent incomes, we need information about the current levels of income and
health of the respondents and about their willingness-to-pay for perfect health.
16In the general model, the equivalent income will also depend on zi and z: For this illustrative exercise,
we assume that z is identical for all individuals.
17We obviously refer to a static context in which the policy maker needs to evaluate a given set of
health care interventions based on people's given preferences. In the long-run, the equivalent income
would need to be recomputed and updated.
21While eliciting income is a common feature of questionnaires in economics, health
needs more attention. For our purposes, it seems preferable to interpret h as a vector
of objective health characteristics. We measured it by presenting respondents with a
detailed list of diseases grouped by categories (e.g. cardio-vascular diseases, respiratory
diseases, etc.). Respondents were asked which of the diseases he or she experienced in the
last twelve months (they could eventually add diseases which are not in the list through
open-ended questions for each of the disease categories).18 Respondents were also asked
about their utilisation of health care services in the last twelve months (number of visits
to a general practitioner, number of visits to a specialist, if they have a private health
insurance, etc.) as well as about the usual socio-demographic characteristics.
Once respondents completed the income and health questionnaires, they were pre-
sented with the equivalent income questions. The introduction ran as follows:
During the rst part of the questionnaire, you provided us information
on your health in the past 12 months and on your current health. You also
provided us information on your nancial resources. We now would like to
evaluate with you the burden of your health problems in the past 12 months
and the way you compare health gains and income.
After this introduction, respondents were given a brief summary of their responses
to the health and nancial resources questions. They were then shown the following
hypothetical scenario:19
If no health problems had occurred in the past 12 months and you would
therefore have been in perfect health, you would have saved the health expen-
ditures that you stated earlier. Moreover, you would have beneted from a
18This part of the questionnaire is derived from the IRDES (Institut de recherche et documentation en
 economie de la sant e) health questionnaire which is meant to study health inequalities (see, for instance,
Jusot et al., 2008). A complete description of the data is presented in Fleurbaey et al (2008).
19We think that the formulation in the rst sentence (\...and you would therefore have been in perfect
health") is justied, because the list of diseases given in the rst part of the questionnaire was very
extensive, including both minor and serious diseases.
22better quality of life. Without accounting for health expenditures, would you
have preferred a lower income in the last 12 months without any of the health
problems that you had? (yes/no/don't know)
Respondents answering \yes" were asked the valuation question:
Indicate the monthly decrease in your personal consumption in the last 12
months that you would have accepted to forgo in order to be in perfect health
(during the same period of time) on top of the health expenditures that you
would have saved.
When answering this question, respondents were helped by a payment card presenting
monetary values in intervals starting from \0 euros" to \more than 1500 euros" per
month. The answers given by the 435 respondents (80.3%) that answered \yes" to the
hypothetical scenario question, seem overall quite reasonable without extreme outliers.
They can obviously be interpreted as a \willingness-to-pay" for perfect health. In order
to avoid confusion with the willingness-to-pay WTPi for specic projects, we will denote
them by w
i. The equivalent income of individual i can then be calculated as y
i = yi w
i.
It is not obvious whether the theoretical concept yi should best be measured by the
personal income of the respondent or by her household income per consumption unit. We
will work with personal income for this illustrative exercise.
In our sample, 101 respondents (18.6%) answered \no" to the hypothetical scenario
question and only 6 respondents (1.1%) did not know. The latter two groups were asked
a series of questions in order to distinguish the individuals who expressed no concern for
health from those who protested at the evaluation exercise or found it too dicult. A
detailed analysis of these debrieng questions for the respondents that answered \no",
identies four classes of motivations. Only 2 respondents found the evaluation exercise
dicult, 52 respondents declared that other aspects of their life were more important, 36
respondents declared that their level of income was already too low, and, interestingly,
23only 11 respondents refused to participate in the evaluation exercise. This protest rate
of 2% over the whole sample is particularly low, which might be due to the fact that our
scenario does not involve state intervention and new taxes.20 Protest responses, \don't
know" responses and answers for the individuals that found the evaluation exercise too
dicult were excluded from the analysis. For the remaining respondents that did not
answer the valuation question, we put w
i = 0 (and, therefore, y
i = yi).
[INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE]
[INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE]
Descriptive statistics on WTP values show that mean WTP increases with personal
income. Mean WTP is A C33 in the rst quartile of the income distribution, A C48.1 in the
second, A C66.1 in the third and A C150.2 in the fourth. Table 1 shows that the mean ratio
of WTP over personal income decreases along personal income quartiles. WTP values
thus increase less than proportionally with personal income. In Table 2, we report the
relationship between the mean ratio of WTP over personal income and access to health
care, measured as the number of visits to a general practitioner (GP). Finally, Table 3
presents the relationship between the mean ratio and current self-reported health (the
dierent categories are the modalities of a standard verbal scale question as, for instance,
in the Short Form 12). As expected, the ratio decreases with health.21
[INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE]
20State intervention and taxes are identied as an important source of protest responses in contingent
valuation surveys for health interventions in France (see, for instance, Luchini et al., 2003).
21Respondents reporting excellent current health may have had health problems in the last 12 months.
244.3 Estimation of distributional weights on the basis of equiva-
lent incomes
As (6) shows, the information about y
i (estimated as yi   w
i) is not sucient to calcu-
late the distributional weights. In addition, we need information about the derivative of
y
i(yi;hi;zi) with respect to yi. As described before, information about health status hi is
captured in the questionnaire by information about specic diseases. For tractability, we
proxy health by two variables di1 and di2, which indicate respectively the number of mild
and severe diseases that the respondent experienced in the last twelve months.22 Neglect-





i = yi   w

i = U(yi;d1i;d2i) + i (7)
where y
i is respondent's healthy equivalent income per month, yi is respondent's monthly
personal income; w
i is the (latent) amount of personal consumption that the respondent
would have been willing to forgo in order to avoid his health problems; U(:) is her utility
function; d1i and d2i are the number of mild and severe diseases respectively.23
The utility function U(:) is specied in a exible way as a polynomial in its arguments















where K is the order of the polynomial and determines the exibility of the utility function.
When K is arbitrarily large, the parameters (p;q;r) can be seen as a non-parametric
family of utility functions (with (0;0;0) normalised to 0). The order of the polynomial K
22We classied the number of diseases according to a scale proposed by IRDES: severe diseases are
those diseases that lead to a decrease of professional or domestic activity, reduced mobility or worse
(Khlat et al., 2000, 2004).
23Remember that the utility function in our interpretation is only a representation of preferences.
25that can be used in a nite sample is usually small. To ensure computational tractability,
we set K = 3 in the following. Note that we do not impose any monotonicity or concavity
restrictions on the utility function. We will rather check if these properties are satised
by the unrestricted estimates.
The maximal amount of personal consumption w
i that the respondent would have
been willing to forgo in order to avoid his health problems during the last 12 months is
not observed directly. Because a payment card was used to elicit preferences, we rather
observe an interval We therefore estimate model (7) by using an interval regression where
yi   w
i is the dependent variable that belongs to the interval

yi   W l






i are the bounds of the interval that respondent i chose in stating her preferences
for health and income. Note that when respondents stated a zero value (but were not
protesting to the valuation question), the observation is considered as an uncensored
observation.
[INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE]
Econometric results are presented in Table 4. For computational tractability, monthly
personal income is divided by 100 in the estimation (reparametrization based on parameter
estimates is easily done). The interval regression is estimated on a restricted sample of
respondents who declared a strictly positive personal income (however small it is) and/or
did not protest to the valuation question if they stated a zero value. This leads to exclude
30 respondents, that is 5.53% of the original sample (30 other respondents were also
excluded due to missing data). From the remaining, 400 respondents stated a positive
amount (and are therefore considered as censored observations) and 82 respondents stated
a zero value (and are therefore considered as uncensored observations).
Coecients of the utility function associated with mild diseases d1 only are not sig-
nicant (linear, square and cubic coecients with p = :138, p = :494 and p = 800
respectively) whereas those associated with severe diseases d2 are signicant (p = :053,
26p = :005 and p = :018). Second, one of the interaction coecients between mild diseases
d1 and severe diseases d2 is signicant too: (2;1;0) is negative with p = :087. This
means in particular that a mild disease d1 induces a utility loss when the respondent has
also suered from a more severe disease d2. Third, coecients associated with income
only are all signicant: (0;0;1) with p < :001, (0;0;2) with p = :051 and (0;0;3)
with p = :044. Finally, only one interaction coecient that includes personal income Y
is signicant and negative: (0;2;1) with p = :022. This indicates that the loss of utility
induced by having suered from a severe disease increases with personal income.
Based on the estimated parameters, it is possible to draw maps of indierence curves
between income per consumption unit and the number of diseases d1 and d2 that occurred
in the last twelve months. To facilitate the reading of these curves, we construct two health
indices h1 and h2 on the basis of the numbers of mild and severe diseases d1 and d2. Having
suered of no diseases during the last 12 months corresponds to maximal health, h1 = 1
and h2 = 1. The lower bound depends on the type of disease considered. We draw the
indierence curves on a range from 0 to 8 for diseases d1 (99.2% of the sample), so that
h1 = (8   d1)=8, and on a range from 0 to 4 for diseases d2 (99.6% of the sample), so
that h2 = (4   d2)=4. This is because it would be hazardous to draw indierence curves
where no data points (or only a few) are available. In addition, we focus on signicant
parameter estimates only to simplify the analysis. Because one interaction term between
d1 and d2 is signicant, we have to set dierent levels of d2 (resp. d1) when considering
the indierence curves between personal income y and d1 (resp. d2). We consider the case
where d2 equals zero, one and three (and proceed identically for the indierence curves
between personal income and d2). Indierence curves are presented in Figures 1(a), 1(b),
1(c), 1(d), 1(e) and 1(f).24 The results are reassuring. In the relevant range of the
variables, the gures exhibit well-behaved indierence curves and satisfy monotonicity
24In order to get a better understanding, estimated utility levels are indicated in the Figure. However,
they have no particular meaning in absolute terms, since they depend on the usual normalisation to zero
of the constant term in random utility models that use a polynomial form (see Van Soest et al., 2002).
27and convexity properties, although none of these properties were imposed a priori.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE]
Finally, we can now compute the distributional weights (6) from the estimated pa-
rameters. The results are presented in Table 5. We focus on the number of severe diseases
only because its eect on equivalent income is the largest and was estimated signicantly.
Weights are computed for three cases with respect to health: a respondent who has not
experienced any severe disease, one severe disease and two severe diseases (for each of
these examples, we assume that the respondent has not experienced any mild disease so
that a respondent with d2 = 0 is assumed to have been in good health in the last twelve
months). For each case, we compute dierent weights according to dierent levels of per-
sonal income. Estimated weights are normalized by attributing a weight of one to the
poorer and sicker individual in the Table, i.e., to an individual who has experienced two
severe diseases and has a personal income of 500 euros.
[INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE]
As shown in (6), the weights combine two components: 1) the social marginal value
of y
i; which increases when yi is lower and i suers from more diseases; 2) the derivative
of y
i with respect to yi; which decreases when i suers from more severe diseases (due
to the strongly negative parameter (0;2;1)). The table shows that the latter eect
always dominates for our data: distributional weights decrease monotically with respect
to personal income and health. Note also that for " = 5, the social welfare function gets
close to maximin, with all weights close to zero except that of the individual with the
lowest equivalent income.
285 Conclusion
We have argued that cost-benet analysis is a theoretically coherent method of economic
evaluation, under the (strict) condition that distributional weights are introduced. These
weights should not be retrieved from current policies by revealed-preference techniques,
but should reect ethical perspectives. Cost-benet analysis respects individual prefer-
ences, without being necessarily subjectively welfarist. Indeed, with the notion of equiv-
alent income, we have shown a particular way to calculate distributional weights without
resorting to welfarist comparisons of subjective utilities, and more in line with recent
egalitarian theories of justice. The extra-welfarist intuitions of many health economists
can thus be accommodated within cost-benet analysis.
We do not claim that the equivalent income approach developed in this paper provides
the only reasonable criterion. First, it is actually a family of criteria, since it can be
applied with a variety of degrees of inequality aversion and even with dierent forms of
the social evaluation function, thereby espousing many dierent views about social equity.
Second, it is associated with the particular, non-welfarist, view according to which equity
would be a simple matter of equality of resources if no one suered from any health
problem. It is therefore dierent from welfarist theories which are dened in terms of
subjective utilities, and it also diers from non-welfarist theories which are dened in
terms of opportunities or capabilities.25 These other theories, insofar as they command
approval from respectable parties in public deliberations, also deserve to be applied in
suitable variants of cost-benet analysis.
The pilot study we have used to illustrate our theoretical concepts has obvious lim-
itations. More specically, due to the small sample size, we could not provide accurate
estimations of preferences for various socio-demographic groups. This limitation has to
be remedied in future work with larger samples. Yet, the pilot study is suciently re-
25A broader discussion of the introduction of equity (in particular, responsibility) principles in health
policies is made in Fleurbaey (2007).
29assuring to support the main constructive message of this paper that the thorny issue
of determining weights for the summation of willingness to pay is more tractable than
usually thought.
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35A Sample Characteristics (n = 542)
Variable Percentage or mean
Age groups
Less than 30 years old 19%
Between 31 and 40 years old 15%
Between 41 and 50 years old 19%
Between 51 and 60 years old 16%
Between 61 and 70 years old 12%









More than four 12 %
Mean household size 2.58
Personal income




Secondary school certif. 18.8%
University degree 26.7%
36Tables and gures







Table 2: WTP and access to health care
Annual number of Mean ratio
visits to the GP WTP/personal income
Less than 2 6.0 %
2 to 3 8.9 %
3 to 6 7.7 %
More than 6 11.0%
Table 3: WTP and self-reported health
Self-reported health Mean ratio
(verbal scale) WTP/personal income
Very bad 10.9 %
Bad 8.1 %
Good 8.4 %
Very good 5.9 %
Excellent 3.0%
37Variable Parameter estimates p-values
D1 specic linear coef.
(1;0;0) -54.449 0.138
D2 specic linear coef.
(0;1;0) -114.701 0.053?
Y specic linear coef .
(0;0;1) 113.786 0.000???
D1 specic non linear coef.
(2;0;0) 5.091 0.494
(3;0;0) .115 0.800
D2 specic non linear coef.
(0;2;0) 46.623 0.005???
(0;3;0) -4.713 0.018??
Y specic non linear coef.
(0;0;2) -1.271 0.051?
(0;0;3) .012 0.044?












Interaction coef. between Y , D1 and D2
(1;1;1) 1.497 0.244
Standard error 165.28 0.000
Table 4: Interval regression (n = 482)




























(a) D1 and Y with D2 = 0




























(b) D2 and Y with D1 = 0




























(c) D1 and Y with D2 = 1




























(d) D2 and Y with D1 = 1




























(e) D1 and Y with D2 = 3




























(f) D2 and Y with D1 = 3
Figure 1: Indierence curves
39Table 5: Estimated distributional weights for severe diseases (with d1 = 0)
Personal income (euros)
500 1000 1500 2500 3500
" = 1
d2 = 0 0.708 0.354 0.236 0.142 0.101
d2 = 1 0.895 0.416 0.271 0.159 0.113
d2 = 2 1.000 0.459 0.298 0.175 0.124
" = 3
d2 = 0 0.448 0.056 0.017 0.004 0.001
d2 = 1 0.802 0.080 0.022 0.005 0.002
d2 = 2 1.000 0.097 0.026 0.005 0.002
" = 5
d2 = 0 0.284 0.009 0.001 0.000 0.000
d2 = 1 0.719 0.016 0.002 0.000 0.000
d2 = 2 1.000 0.020 0.002 0.000 0.000
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